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INTRODUCTION 
The Innocence Project estimates that at least 20,000 men and 
women are currently incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.1  
The combination of scientific progress and the zealous advocacy of 
attorneys has helped begin to remedy this injustice:  to date, 273 men 
and women have been exonerated through post-conviction DNA 
testing.2 
Notwithstanding these exonerations, inmates still face great 
difficulties gaining access to untested DNA evidence.3  Today, the two 
options inmates may use to obtain DNA evidence at the federal level 
are a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22544 or a civil 
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5  The United States 
Supreme Court has attempted to carve out distinctions between these 
options so that § 1983 is not used when habeas is more appropriate.6  
Those distinctions, however, produced a circuit split regarding 
whether § 1983 requests for post-conviction DNA evidence should 
succeed.7  The Court’s recent decision in Skinner v. Switzer,8 resolved 
                                                          
 1. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 200 EXONERATED, TOO MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 
43 n.1, http://www.innocenceproject.org/200/ip_200.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) 
(explaining how current research by several professors was used to reach the 
estimated number of innocent men and women behind bars). 
 2. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
know/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (reviewing the Innocence Project’s case profiles 
and providing statistics regarding exonerations since the advent of DNA testing).  
 3. See David A. Schumacher, Comment, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing:  The 
Federal Government Does Not Offer an Adequate Solution, Leaving the States to Remedy the 
Situation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2008) (referring to the quest for DNA 
evidence as “an almost insurmountable uphill climb”).  As one example of how 
difficult this can be, “the State of Virginia only recently removed a rule that granted 
defendants a time period of merely twenty-one days after sentencing is finalized to 
present new evidence.”  See Jason Borenstein, DNA in the Legal System:  The Benefits Are 
Clear, The Problems Aren’t Always, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 847, 860 n.91 
(2006). 
 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (allowing prisoners to challenge their convictions 
under the Constitution based on a misapplication of the facts). 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a remedy in federal court when state 
courts fail to adequately protect federal rights). 
 6. See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey:  Should the Favorable 
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 868, 868–69 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court has dealt with the 
overlapping nature of the two legal remedies over time). 
 7. Compare McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that 
a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is proper even if success on the claim might indicate a 
wrongful conviction), and Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding 
a post-conviction DNA § 1983 claim did not necessarily imply the invalidity of the 
prisoner’s sentence although success might afford the prisoner an opportunity to use 
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the split and held that § 1983 requests for post-conviction DNA 
testing are proper.9 
Part I of this Note discusses post-conviction access to DNA 
evidence, describes the facts and procedural history of Skinner, and 
examines the Court’s decision and dissent in Skinner.  Specifically, 
Part I focuses on the Court’s restriction of the issue to § 1983 and the 
concerns of dissenting Justice Thomas that these claims are only 
appropriate in habeas corpus claims.  Part II argues that allowing § 
1983 access would not have been necessary if the Court recognized a 
freestanding actual innocence claim.  Finally, this Note analyzes how 
current restrictions to federal habeas corpus render a prisoner’s 
ability to seek post-conviction DNA evidence unworkable and argues 
that § 1983 access was a necessary procedural loophole to remedy 
those restrictions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of Post-Conviction Access to DNA Evidence Through Federal 
Habeas Corpus and § 1983 
Today, convicted prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA 
evidence may pursue relief through two avenues.  The first option is 
to use the narrow federal habeas corpus statute, which permits 
prisoners to challenge their detention after being convicted.10  The 
other option is § 1983, a broad federal statute that provides a remedy 
for individuals alleging a variety of constitutional and federal civil 
rights violations by persons acting under color of state law.11  Because 
                                                          
the results of the DNA testing in a future proceeding), and Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 
1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2002) (allowing a § 1983 claim for post-conviction DNA 
testing because granting a prisoner access to DNA evidence does not necessarily 
imply the invalidity of his sentence), with Kutzner v. Montgomery Cnty., 303 F.3d 
339, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (rejecting a § 1983 claim for post-
conviction DNA evidence access because the evidence is entwined with the factual 
findings underlying the conviction), abrogated by Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 
(2011), and Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying a prisoner’s 
§ 1983 claim because he was using it as a discovery device to overturn his state 
conviction), abrogated by Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011). 
 8. 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011). 
 9. Id. at 1298–99.  
 10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) 
(presenting a historical context of habeas corpus as a means of securing freedom 
from a purportedly illegal incarceration). 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing that any person acting under the color 
of law who deprives a U.S. citizen or any person within the U.S. of any right or 
privilege under the Constitution or its laws shall be held liable); Ian D. Forsythe, A 
Guide to Civil Rights Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:  An Overview of Supreme Court and 
Eleventh Circuit Precedent, CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, http://www.constitution.org/brief/ 
forsythe_42-1983.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (outlining the history, elements, 
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§ 1983 is civil in nature, it allows prisoners to request different types 
of relief, including injunctions, damages, and declaratory relief.12  
Unlike in habeas claims, prisoners generally are not required to 
exhaust state remedies under § 1983.13  Additionally, § 1983 claims 
are not subject to the strict time limitations and rules against 
successive filings that characterize the federal habeas statute.14 
The two statutes overlap when a criminal convicted in state court 
challenges the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence in 
federal court because both statutes provide constitutional remedies 
for constitutional violations.15  The Court attempted to clarify this 
apparent overlap in Heck v. Humphrey,16 holding that convicted 
prisoners could not properly proceed under § 1983 if the defendant 
requested relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
conviction or sentence.” Such a request, the Court explained, 
required a habeas analysis.17  However, within the context of DNA 
evidence, § 1983 access may or may not “necessarily impl[y]” the 
invalidity of the prisoner’s criminal conviction.18  That question was 
left open until the Court granted certiorari in Skinner v. Switzer. 
B. Skinner v. Switzer:  Facts and Procedural History 
On New Year’s Eve 1993, Henry “Hank” Skinner ingested codeine 
pills and large amounts of alcohol instead of preparing to attend a 
party with his then-girlfriend Twila Busby.19  When their friend, 
Howard Mitchell, arrived at Skinner’s home at 10:15 p.m., he tried to 
wake Skinner, but Skinner was “kind of comatose,” unconscious on 
the couch, and unresponsive to shouting or shaking.20  After waiting 
for fifteen minutes, Mitchell and Busby left for the party without 
                                                          
and defenses pertaining to § 1983 claims). 
 12. Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to 
DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 587–90 (2004) (explaining that a successful 
habeas suit would secure release from prison while a § 1983 claim would not). 
 13. Eric Despotes, Comment, The Evidentiary Watershed:  Recognizing a Post-
Conviction Constitutional Right to Access DNA Evidence Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 49 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 821, 824–25 (2009) (explaining the ways § 1983 claims are less 
restrictive than habeas petitions). 
 14. Id. at 825–26. 
 15. See Note, supra note 6, at 868 (explaining that the overlap between the two 
statutes led to the Supreme Court having to decide whether they were 
interchangeable when a state prisoner challenges his conviction or confinement). 
 16. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
 17. Id. at 487. 
 18. See cases cited supra note 7 (showing the various decisions after Heck 
regarding whether post-conviction access to DNA evidence “necessarily implies” the 
invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction). 
 19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–8, Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 
(2011) (No. 09-9000). 
 20. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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him.21  During the party, Robert Donnell, Busby’s uncle, drunkenly 
stalked and made crude sexual remarks to Busby.22  Busby asked 
Mitchell to take her home, and when Mitchell returned to the party 
Donnell was no longer there.23  Twila Busby and her two sons were 
later found brutally murdered.24 
At Skinner’s trial, the prosecution did not consider strong evidence 
that indicated Donnell was the real murderer.25  A toxicologist gave 
expert testimony that Skinner was too impaired by the alcohol and 
codeine in his system to have had the strength to commit the 
murder.26  Furthermore, a large quantity of DNA evidence that could 
have conclusively identified the true killer remained untested.27  
Despite an alternative suspect, evidence that Skinner likely did not 
possess the strength or coordination to commit the murders, and an 
abundance of untested DNA evidence, a jury convicted Skinner of 
capital murder and sentenced him to death.28 
Beginning in 2000, Skinner requested that the district attorney 
grant him access to the untested DNA evidence; these requests were 
repeatedly denied.29  Skinner also sought access to the evidence 
under Texas’s post-conviction DNA statute and by filing state and 
federal writs for habeas corpus, but he was again denied.30  Finally, 
Skinner sought post-conviction access to DNA testing using one of 
                                                          
 21. Id. at 8–9. 
 22. Id. at 11. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 7–8. 
 25. See id. at 11 (discussing Donnell’s violent past behavior and his inappropriate 
conduct on the night of the murder).   
 26. See id. at 10 (providing that an expert at trial opined that Skinner was “at best 
in a ‘stuporous’ condition” at the time of the murders, “such that it would have 
required all of his physical and mental agility just to stand,” and thus was not 
physically able to execute the murders). 
 27. Id. at 12–13 (identifying seven items that Skinner asked to be  tested:  vaginal 
swabs taken from Busby at the time of her autopsy; Busby’s fingernail clippings; a 
knife found on the front porch of Busby’s house; a knife found in a plastic bag in the 
living room of the same house; a dishtowel found in the same plastic bag; a 
windbreaker jacket found in the living room next to Busby’s body; and any hairs 
found on Busby’s hands that had not been destroyed by previous testing). 
 28. Id. at 5. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Skinner v. Quarterman, No. 2:99-CV-0045, 2007 WL 582808, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Feb. 22, 2007) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court), 
aff’d, 576 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009); Skinner v. State, 122 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2003) (denying attempts to gain access via state post-conviction procedures), 
aff’d, 293 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ex parte Skinner, No. 20,203-04 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2001) (unpublished), available at 
http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/EventInfo.asp?EventID=1982389 
(dismissing state habeas corpus claim because of pending federal habeas corpus 
claim). 
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the last existing means available—§ 1983.31  Nonetheless, Skinner was 
denied relief and faced an impending execution.32 
The Supreme Court granted Skinner a stay less than an hour 
before he was scheduled to be executed.33  The Court granted 
certiorari and heard oral arguments in his case on October 13, 2010.34  
The issue before the Court was whether a convicted prisoner seeking 
access to biological evidence for DNA testing may assert that claim in 
a civil rights action under § 1983, or whether such a claim may be 
asserted only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.35 
C. Skinner v. Switzer:  The Supreme Court’s Decision and Justice 
Thomas’s Dissent 
In Skinner, the Court measured Skinner’s claim against its prior 
holding in Heck v. Humphrey that § 1983 claims are not proper if “a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”36  In finding that Skinner’s 
request for DNA would not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of his 
conviction, the Court emphasized that the test results might 
implicate, rather than exculpate, Skinner.37  The respondent had 
argued that Skinner’s ultimate aim in requesting DNA testing was to 
attack his conviction.38  The Court responded that there was no case 
in which it recognized habeas as the sole remedy “where the relief 
sought would ‘neither terminat[e] custody, accelerat[e] the future 
date of release from custody, nor reduc[e] the level of custody.’”39 
Respondent and its amici expressed concerns about the expansion 
of federal jurisdiction; specifically, they predicted a surge of federal 
civil actions.40  The Court, however, noted that these concerns were 
unwarranted for the following reasons: (1) the circuits that currently 
allow § 1983 claims for DNA testing have not shown any “flood or 
                                                          
 31. Skinner v. Switzer, 364 F. App’x 113, 113 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). 
 32. Id. at 114; cf. Kutzner v. Montgomery Cnty., 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that a § 1983 action was not the proper avenue to bring a post-conviction 
claim for DNA). 
 33. Lyle Denniston, Execution Delayed in DNA Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 24, 2010, 
6:17 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/execution-delayed-in-dna-case-2/. 
 34. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1289, 1293 (2011). 
 35. Id. at 1293. 
 36. Id. at 1298 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38. Id. at 1299 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
 39. Id. (quoting Dotson, 544 U.S. at 86 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 40. Id. 
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even rainfall” of litigation;41 (2) the Court’s recent decision in District 
Attorney’s Office v. Osborne,42 where it rejected a substantive due process 
basis for these types of claims, makes the toll on federal courts even 
more unlikely;43 and (3) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 
1995,44 Congress limited prisoner suits to “prevent sportive filings in 
federal court.”45 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that allowing § 1983 
challenges like Skinner’s would undermine Congress’s strict 
limitation on federal review of state habeas decisions and contended 
that Skinner’s claims should only be brought in habeas corpus.46  
Because collateral review procedures permit challenges to a 
conviction only after the conviction is final, Justice Thomas argued, 
procedural challenges “concern[] the validity of a conviction.”47  
Furthermore, Justice Thomas emphasized that Congress has limited 
federal habeas challenges to state convictions and state habeas 
decisions because of concerns for federal-state comity, and he labeled 
§ 1983 claims as undercutting those restrictions.48  As a result, Justice 
Thomas proclaimed that the Court’s decision facilitates additional § 
1983 claims related to the state habeas process and allows for another 
“bite at the apple” after unsuccessful habeas claims.49 
II. ANALYSIS 
Section 1983 access would not have been necessary if the Court 
had recognized a freestanding actual innocence claim.  Further, 
because the Court only decided the narrower issue, § 1983 access was 
necessary in the post-conviction DNA context due to the combination 
of current federal habeas restrictions.  Barring § 1983 claims would 
leave prisoners with valid constitutional claims unable to access 
evidence that could conclusively establish their guilt or innocence. 
                                                          
 41. Id. 
 42. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009). 
 43. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299; see Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 (rejecting the 
extension of substantive due process to the post-conviction context and, therefore, 
leaving little room for a prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him due 
process). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 45. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 46. Id. at 1302 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 1303. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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A. Section 1983 Access Would Not Have Been Necessary if the Court Had 
Recognized a Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim 
In the future, the Court could provide a viable path for post-
conviction DNA testing in federal habeas corpus claims by 
recognizing a freestanding actual innocence claim.  In Herrera v. 
Collins,50 the Supreme Court held that simply alleging a defendant is 
“actual[ly] innocen[t]” does not, by itself, make a cognizable 
constitutional claim.51  Although the Court said a “truly persuasive 
demonstration of ‘actual innocence’” could make a sufficient 
constitutional claim, it did not elaborate on what would be “truly 
persuasive.”52  By placing an extraordinarily lofty burden on a 
hypothetically achievable freestanding claim of innocence, the Court 
has rendered habeas relief a mere mysticism.53 
Since Herrera, the Court has been unwilling to clarify its stance, 
making federal habeas actions based on actual innocence claims 
problematic.54  In 2006, the Court’s decision in House v. Bell55 again 
assumed that a federal constitutional right to relief based on a 
showing of actual innocence exists.56  But the Court suggested that to 
prevail on a claim of actual innocence, a prisoner would have to meet 
a substantially high bar.57  In Osborne, the Court held that the 
freestanding actual innocence issue was still an “open question.”58  
Importantly, the Court noted that if a freestanding actual innocence 
claim did exist, it would be brought in habeas.59  The Court 
elaborated that if such a claim were subsequently found “viable,” then 
“federal procedural rules [would] permit discovery ‘for good 
cause.’”60  Two months later, the Court ordered a hearing in the case 
of a Georgia death row inmate, Troy Davis, on the issue of “actual 
innocence,” stating that it would violate the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to execute an innocent 
                                                          
 50. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 51. Id. at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52. Id. at 417. 
 53. See Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2950 
(2010) (“For seventeen years since Herrera was decided in 1993, the federal courts 
have operated under what Justice Scalia called ‘a strange regime’ assuming that an 
actual innocence claim exists, but unsure of its status or context.”). 
 54. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (holding that although a 
prisoner had “cast doubt” on his conviction, he failed to meet the “extraordinarily 
high” burden of a freestanding innocence claim implied in Herrera).  
 55. 547 U.S. 518 (2006). 
 56. Id. at 522. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321–22 (2009). 
 59. Id. at 2322. 
 60. Id. (citations omitted). 
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man, as Davis claimed to be.61  Skinner afforded the Court an 
opportunity to clarify this ambiguous stance on claims of actual 
innocence; however, the Court chose to restrict its decision to the 
narrow § 1983 issue.62 
By failing to resolve Herrera and its progeny and adopt a 
constitutional innocence claim in light of modern DNA testing’s 
ability to prove innocence, the Supreme Court again demonstrated 
its reluctance to fully respond to scientific progress and blocked relief 
for prisoners trying to seek habeas relief.63  The Court’s underlying 
rationale in Herrera focused on concepts of finality and reliability that 
are no longer valid because of DNA’s probative value.64  Herrera was 
decided only four years after DNA evidence became available and 
when states were divided on how to deal with new evidence of 
innocence.65  Forty-eight states have since enacted post-conviction 
statutes to provide relief to prisoners seeking access to DNA 
evidence.66  Furthermore, DNA evidence today lasts for decades and 
can prove guilt or innocence more accurately than any of the 
traditional evidence underlying the Court’s previous reliability 
concerns.67   
Because finality concerns no longer exist in the post-conviction 
DNA context, the Court could have ensured uniformity by 
establishing a freestanding innocence claim in Skinner.68  However, 
the Court chose only to decide the narrower issue and rightly held 
that prisoners may seek access to post-conviction DNA testing under § 
1983.69  By doing so, the Court continued to duck the larger issue and 
                                                          
 61. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (mem.). 
 62. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) (explaining that the Court 
was only deciding whether there was federal court subject matter jurisdiction over 
Skinner’s complaint and whether his § 1983 claims were proper). 
 63. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1700 
(2008) (opining that if the Court had established a freestanding innocence claim in 
House and reconsidered Herrera, “it might have concluded that the advent of DNA 
testing upended the two pillars supporting the decision:  reliability and finality”). 
 64. See id. at 1701 (arguing that the weak evidence of innocence in Herrera led 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, despite their support of a freestanding innocence 
claim, to join the majority opinion). 
 65. Id. at 1702. 
 66. Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
news/LawView2.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
 67. See Garrett, supra note 63, at 1703 (citing Christopher H. Asplen, Integrating 
DNA Technology into the Criminal Justice System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 146 (1999)) 
(describing the difference between modern DNA evidence and earlier tests’ ability to 
establish guilt or innocence). 
 68. See id. at 1717 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s conflicted reaction to 
modern advancements in DNA testing would be solved if it adopted a constitutional 
innocence claim). 
 69. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) (holding that Skinner’s 
other challenges were not ripe for consideration). 
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effectively rendered the existence of freestanding actual innocence 
claims in federal habeas corpus “as little more than false beacons of 
hope:  claims that can be raised and argued but never, as a practical 
reality, won.”70 
B. The Court Created a Necessary Procedural Loophole by Allowing             
§ 1983 Claims for Post-Conviction DNA Access Due to the Current Federal 
Habeas Corpus Restrictions 
In 1963, Professor Paul Bator wrote a famous law review article 
about the scope of federal habeas corpus, and his argument became 
known as Bator’s Process View.71  Bator’s Process View argues that the 
possibility the last court to hear a case could make a mistake always 
exists no matter how many times a prior judgment is reviewed.72  The 
Process View’s standard is to create a procedural model that provides 
“a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice will be done.”73  In 
applying this standard to habeas corpus, Bator’s theory would ask:  
did the measures and processes of the state court, which previously 
determined the facts and applied the law, give the prisoner a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate his claims?74  According to Bator, if the 
prisoner was given an adequate opportunity to litigate any federal 
claims in state court, then the federal courts should defer to previous 
state judgments.75 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) builds on Bator’s Process View and presents significant 
procedural obstacles that hamper potential federal habeas corpus 
relief.76  Specifically, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and 
                                                          
 70. Kathleen Callahan, Note, In Limbo:  In re Davis and the Future of Herrera 
Innocence Claims in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 636 (2011). 
 71. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus 
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (arguing that federal questions in state 
criminal trials should only be revisited by federal courts when challenging the state’s 
decisional process rather than the decision itself). 
 72. See id. at 446–48 (explaining the problem of finality and presenting the 
underlying premise that because no tribunal is infallible, no certainty of guilt exists 
for any detention); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only 
because we are final.”).  
 73. Bator, supra note 71, at 448; cf. Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review:  Question of Law, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 244 (1955) (“The question then is not whether the fact exists in 
an absolute sense but whether the evidence is adequate to justify the exercise of 
power:  ultimately, whether the evidence is a sufficient moral predicate in the sense 
that society will accept it as sufficient for the exercise of the power in question.”). 
 74. Bator, supra note 71, at 449. 
 75. Id. at 462. 
 76. See CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE:  HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 35, 162 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 2006) (explaining that the AEDPA’s 
habeas limitations and federal deference to state court fact finding are very difficult 
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restrictions on a prisoner’s ability to file second or successive 
petitions with a new, previously unasserted claim prevents federal 
courts from considering new evidence of innocence in post-
conviction DNA access cases because untested DNA evidence usually 
surfaces years after trial.77  Thus, pursuing federal habeas claims is a 
difficult road for prisoners, like Skinner, to travel when trying to 
access DNA evidence post-conviction because newly discovered 
evidence claims do not state a ground for habeas relief absent an 
independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying 
state criminal proceeding.78 
Despite the aforementioned restrictions on a prisoner’s ability to 
seek post-conviction DNA testing in a federal habeas petition, Justice 
Thomas still contends that this type of challenge may not be brought 
under § 1983.79  Contrary to Justice Thomas’s argument, however, 
Skinner is not attempting to circumvent habeas:  he has already 
failed.80  Further, the AEDPA substantially limits the ability of federal 
courts to hear new evidence of innocence.81  As a result, the current 
restrictions on federal habeas corpus coupled with a bar on § 1983 
claims would leave prisoners with valid constitutional claims unable 
to access evidence that could conclusively establish their guilt or 
innocence.82 
In the event that DNA testing provides a favorable result after 
receiving access to the evidence, a federal habeas petition would not 
necessarily follow, particularly given the current state of freestanding 
                                                          
to get around); Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 
44 (2007) (“AEDPA has the effect of limiting the habeas claims a federal court may 
review, effectively eliminating many habeas petitions at the district court level, and 
even more, by narrowly restraining the limitation period during which a habeas 
petition may be filed, effectively reducing the number of claims any federal court 
hears.” (footnotes omitted)).  But see ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS:  RETHINKING 
THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 153 (2001) (arguing that the final version of the AEDPA 
enacted modest reforms relative to the proposals that came before it). 
 77. Garrett, supra note 63, at 1689. 
 78. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (noting that newly discovered 
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not, by itself, a ground for relief 
on federal habeas corpus); Susan Bandes, Simple Murder:  A Comment on the Legality of 
Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 516–18 (1996) (arguing for consideration 
of newly-discovered evidence in federal court). 
 79. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 80. See Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 35–36, 
Skinner v. Switzer, No. 2:09-CV-0281, 2010 WL 273143 (N.D. Tex. 2010), 2009 WL 
5143302 at *35–36 (distinguishing Skinner’s case from Osborne by showing that 
Skinner, unlike Osborne, has already twice attempted to seek testing through state 
procedures rather than going straight to § 1983). 
 81. See Garrett, supra note 63, at 1688–89 (describing the provision restricting 
claims for new evidence of innocence under the AEDPA). 
 82. See id. at 1690 (noting that habeas corpus claims for a new evidentiary 
hearing for untested DNA evidence are highly unlikely). 
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claims of actual innocence.83  On the contrary, subsequent to 
favorable DNA test results, a prisoner would be more likely to 
proceed through clemency, seek prosecutorial consent to vacate, or 
pursue other established mechanisms for post-conviction relief.84  
Therefore, the Court’s decision allowing Skinner to bring his claim 
under § 1983 does not undermine the current limitations Congress 
has placed on federal habeas.85  Instead, Skinner provides a necessary 
opportunity for a prisoner to seek DNA testing that could 
conclusively prove innocence or guilt without expanding those 
restrictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Skinner decision, on its face, appears to be a positive 
development for prisoners seeking DNA evidence and testing that 
can conclusively prove their guilt or innocence.  This Note has 
shown, however, that allowing prisoners to seek DNA testing under § 
1983 was a procedural loophole necessary only because of the way 
habeas corpus claims in this context are foreclosed.  While providing 
this avenue to prisoners may signal the Court’s increased recognition 
of modern DNA testing’s probative value, it is also evidence of the 
Court’s failure to change its habeas corpus jurisprudence 
accordingly.   
When objective, scientific proof is readily available, no justification 
exists to support a court’s refusal to order a test that could 
conclusively establish innocence or guilt.  The Supreme Court should 
recognize that access to post-conviction DNA testing is not another 
“bite at the apple” but rather an extraordinary opportunity to prove 
actual innocence. 
                                                          
 83. See id. at 1691–92 (finding that no one has been exonerated by post-
conviction DNA under an actual innocence claim during appeals before acquiring 
DNA testing because Herrera only established a hypothetical claim with an 
extraordinarily high burden); see also Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 126 (3d Cir. 
2007) (holding that the Herrera standard was not met). 
 84. See Garrett, supra note 53, at 2932 n.103 (noting that in eighty-eight percent 
of cases resulting in exonerations the prosecutors consented to motions to vacate 
convictions, and in eighty-two percent prosecutors allowed for DNA testing (citation 
omitted)). 
 85. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
